A Study on the Influence of Local Officials' Characteristics on Environmental Pollution Governance Expenditure---Based on the Local Leadership Data from 300 Poor Counties in 2014 by 韩笑
学校编码：10384 分类号 密级 .
学号：13920141150451 UDC .




A Study on the Influence of Local Officials' Characteristics
on Environmental Pollution Governance Expenditure




专 业 名 称：行政管理
论文提交日期：2017 年 4 月
论文答辩时间：2017 年 5 月


















































































China's economy continues to grow at a high speed since the reformation and
opening. Under the performance promotion incentive mechanism, officials over the
pursuit of economic development, and brought a lot of negative impacts,
environmental pollution is getting worse, the contradictions between economic and
environment become more and more significant. Under the pattern of Chinese fiscal
decentralization and political centralization, we need to focus on the influence of local
government officials on the expenditure of environmental pollution governance in the
area. Optimizing the structure of fiscal decentralization and rationally guiding local
government officials to balance the relationship between environmental pollution and
economic development will become an important thought of environmental
governance in China.
This paper analyzes the relationship between the local officials' characteristics
and the expenditure of environmental pollution governance from both theoretical and
empirical aspects. The results of the theoretical analysis show that under the system of
fiscal decentralization in China, different local officials’ characteristics will have
different effects on the expenditure of environmental pollution governance in the area.
There is a significant positive correlation between the age of local officials and the
expenditure of environmental pollution governance; there is a significant negative
correlation between the years of service of local officials and the expenditure of
environmental pollution governance; there is a significant negative correlation
between the working area of local officials and the expenditure of environmental
pollution governance; there is a significant negative correlation between the nation of
local officials and the expenditure of environmental pollution governance; there are
no significant correlation between the professional background, education and gender
of local officials and the expenditure of environmental pollution governance. And use
the data of 300 poor counties in the country in 2014, the empirical test of the
hypothesis and supports the theoretical expectation, that is, under the different
behavioral incentives, different local officials' characteristics will have different
effects on the expenditure of environmental pollution governance. On this basis, put
forward some policy recommendations.
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